FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life Lawsuit of 1986
Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) was a nonprofit organization focused on opposing abortion. It was primarily funded by individual contributions and did not receive financial support from business corporations. MCFL’s mission involved educating the public on anti-abortion issues and encouraging political action. In 1978, during a special congressional election, MCFL published and distributed a newsletter that included a “Special Election Edition” listing candidates’ stances on abortion. The publication explicitly endorsed certain candidates who aligned with MCFL’s anti-abortion position. The newsletter was funded using the organization’s general treasury funds rather than a PAC.
FECA prohibited corporations, including nonprofit organizations, from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures explicitly advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate. Such expenditures were only allowed if funded through separate segregated funds (i.e., a political action committee or PAC), which required specific donor and reporting regulations.
The FEC argued that MCFL’s activities violated FECA’s prohibition on corporate-funded independent expenditures. The FEC sought to penalize MCFL for failing to establish a PAC and for using its general treasury funds to make the expenditures. MCFL argued that its independent expenditures were a form of political speech protected by the First Amendment. It contended that applying FECA restrictions to its nonprofit activities was overly broad and infringed on its rights to engage in political advocacy.
The case raised questions about whether nonprofit, ideological organizations should be treated the same as for-profit corporations under campaign finance laws. MCFL claimed that its structure and purpose differed fundamentally from traditional corporations, which the laws were primarily designed to regulate.
On December 15, 1986 the Supreme Court, in a split 5-4 decision, found that although MCFL was clearly engaged in express advocacy, the law in question was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL because the organization was created in order to disseminate political ideas, wasn’t a for-profit corporation and didn’t accept contributions from for-profit corporations. The ruling created an exception to FECA’s prohibition on corporate expenditures, allowing ideological nonprofits to engage in unlimited independent expenditures using their general funds.
This opened the door for similar nonprofit groups to engage in political advocacy without being subject to the same regulatory burdens as for-profit entities. The decision complicated the enforcement of campaign finance laws by requiring regulators to distinguish between ideological nonprofits (like MCFL) and other types of organizations, such as trade associations or for-profit corporations. As a result, there was a significant increase in the formations of nonprofit organizations, some of which blurred the line between policy discussion and electioneering.
The four dissenting justices believed this ruling weakened the ability of Congress to regulate campaign finance and protect the integrity of elections, emphasizing that FECA’s restrictions were enacted to combat both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption, which is essential for maintaining public trust in the electoral process. They argued that allowing corporations to make independent expenditures could lead to increased corruption and undue influence in politics. The dissenting justices were concerned that the ruling created loopholes that could undermine the goals of preventing corruption and efforts to ensure fair and transparent elections by opening the door to more corporate money in politics. The dissent warned that creating an exception for nonprofits like MCFL would lead to evasion of campaign finance laws by other organizations that might seek to exploit this exception. Justice White argued that the financial power of ideological groups, even if derived from individual donations, could still exert undue influence on elections, similar to for-profit corporations.
The case was part of a broader trend of weakening campaign finance restrictions in the name of protecting free speech. The decision was used as judicial precedent in subsequent challenges to campaign finance restrictions, particularly those involving nonprofits and corporations, including Citizens United v. FEC (2010).